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ABSTRACT

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INSTITUTIONALIZING INNOVATION IN AN ORGANIZATION:

A MODEL AND CASE STUDY

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Abstract

A policy systems theoretical analysis of the problem of institutionalizing innovation in an organization is summarized in a flow diagram. The model is presented in terms of specific hypotheses, and then illustrated with a case of frustrated innovation, the 1968-69 crises at San Francisco State College. The model is set up 1) to help understand the process of innovation in an organization both in theory and practice, 2) to highlight turning points and stumbling blocks in attempts to innovate, and 3) to suggest guidelines for implementing change and managing crises along the way. The result should be of benefit to theorists, researchers, policy-makers and administrators.

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Introduction

The first aim of this paper is to systematically analyze the government report on the crisis and strike which constitute the frustrated attempts at educational reform at San Francisco State College during those fateful months from October 1968 to April 1969. The second aim is to illustrate the use of a systematically interrelated set of hypotheses as a model for analyzing any program of attempts to introduce innovation into a formal organization. The reanalysis of reports of previous case material with such a model is one of the best ways to codify data and thus develop better theory about the workings of such organizations. New cases can then be studied more cogently against the background of such a model since it provides a check list and guide for analyzing crucial issues in context. It also makes it easier to relate the theory of innovation in organizations to other areas of social scientific inquiry (such as the workings of small groups, the effectiveness of the functioning of organizations in the hierarchy of other governmental and business enterprises). And the use of such a model should also provide a guide to organizational change agents and consultants for clues as to what needs to be changed and how to go about introducing change. Thus we are proposing a policy-systems oriented research model as a guide to codification, research, and implementation of policy.

The model crosses over the borders of sociology, psychology, political science and practical management. Such loss of disciplinary

boundaries is characteristic of the general systems approach. The systematization provides us with a model and a check list for taking account of the conditions of change within an adequate time-perspective. It is notable that the vast majority of models and theories in social science are seriously lacking in this respect. By the same token, most theories in social science do not see conflict and change as normal ongoing processes. They do not use an open systems model. Several levels and modes of analysis are treated, namely, 1) the individual or collective (public) opinion, 2) factors of the acceptable styles of governing, 3) the hierarchy of the organization, 4) small group social organization, 5) practical mechanisms for change used in an organization, 6) actual problems generated at all levels, 7) sources of change, 8) facilitating conditions of change, and 9) the actual thrust or direction of moves of the initiators in their attempts to procure change.

Clearly the cycle of change in an organization may well be a viscous one. This seems to have been the case at San Francisco State. Any innovation, even if successful, generates new problems of its own for the organization and its members. In this case, there exists the dilemma of "efficient productivity" vs. "innovation" which is introduced to implement achievement or facilitation of long-range deeper values.

The Literature

Some representative literature which relates the present study to developments in the field includes the following. There are many useful starting points, textbooks and monographs which are familiar to any student of formal organizations (such as the work of Blau, 1956). Some writers have tried to classify the types of change process in human systems (such as Bennis, 1973). The present study has benefitted from the conceptual contributions of Gottschalk in his attempt to describe the components of a reform movement (1944).

Still another background source, Olsen (1968) presents very useful general hypotheses about the sources and amount of conflict and change, power and integration from the perspective of several theoretical approaches, including system theory. Buckley (1967) gives a more sophisticated set of principles for systems analysis. Studer (1971) presents a highly general model for the management of change in human systems. A more concrete model by Easton (1968) gives a useful analysis in his "Dynamic Response Model of a Political System." A more specific statement is that by Cadwallader (1959) who began a cybernetic analysis of innovative processes in complex communication systems. Lippitt (1969) presents a cyclical model of the sequence of events which occur in organizational renewal, but without analyzing specific cases. March and Simon (1958) present many dynamic models but assume an inappropriately high degree of rationality to be of much use in analyzing concrete cases of conflict and innovation.

O'Dea (1961), in the context of religious organization, provides a useful tool for analysis in his "dilemma of administrative order." This is related to the problem of institutionalization of charisma

discussed by Weber ( ), especially as applied to the Catholic Church. (1954)
Gouldner specifies the crucial dilemma which is the most directly relevant previous study which examines the problem of management through bureaucratic rules. Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) give many cogent definitions and hypotheses about the process of using power at the national and international levels. Moore (1962) describes many candid and practical insights into the workings and foibles of administration and administrators in the corporation. Swanson (1971) suggests only a couple of basic principles for routinization of change, but makes no attempt to place them in a more general process framework. Strauss et al (1963) suggests the basic principle of a "negotiated order." Many articles in another reader by Bennis et al (1969) provide further background ideas such as the articles by Barnes (on general approaches to organizational change), Schön (on general mechanisms of change), Walton (on dilemmas of change which focus on power vs. attitude), Watson (who lists topics on resistance to change in personalities and social systems), Shephard (on organizations which resist vs. produce innovation), Bennis (on human problems confrinting contemporary organizations), Leeds (on notions on the absorption of protest), McClelland (on a theory of motive acquisition), and Chin (who compares system vs. developmental models for practitioners).

More directly related to the problems of education include the work of Stinchcombe (1964) which systematically describes the causes of rebellious behavior in youth in a high school. Blauner (1972) concretely describes relevant implications of racism in colleges as well as some problems in instituting Black Studies programs. Foote et al (1968) bring together many proposals and recommendations for redirecting the administration of a highly significant case,

that of U. C. Berkeley. Corwin (1974) brings together many useful concepts for analyzing and understanding educational crisis and change. Perhaps the most useful study of all is that of Baldridge (1971) which compares models, the political, bureaucratic and collegial, He outlines the cycle of conflict, and gives many other helpful summary charts based on an extensive study of a large university (NYU). He discusses clusters of variables at given phases of conflict, but doesn't approach the specificity of a general systems model. Nor does he deal with or develop a model of the natural sequence of the typical events that occur in the process of attempting to implement change. Overall (except in chapter 5) he also appears to look at the issues more from the point of view of the administrator than from that of a group of students (and some faculty) who want to make changes. One function of the present study is to fill some of these gaps.

Orrick (1970) provides the case to be analyzed here. His work is almost purely descriptive, and intentionally so. The only recommendations he makes are put in the words of those directly involved and they were stated in public during the time of the crisis. This fact makes the report a very uncolored, objective case for the present analysis and interpretation.

Background Analysis

The attempt is made here to have a reasonably complete list of variables, yet a list capable of elaboration as new conceptual elements or aspects are discovered. *Mutatis mutandis*, the succeeding formulation of hypotheses was stated so as to be easily generalizable to any large-scale organization. It should at least provide a diagnostic starting point for analyzing attempts at innovation. The analysis is presented however in a way that will likely raise more questions than it solves. It is deliberately written in the context of discovery rather than of verification. Naturally, with only one case study it is not possible to prove hypotheses, but only to demonstrate them. Furthermore, certain hypotheses are separately, by themselves, not highly explanatory. They are however necessary links in the chain of events, and thus provide the theorist with essential information.

The turmoil at San Francisco State can perhaps best be understood in terms of some differences between several conflict-of-interest groups, particularly 1) differences between the Blacks and other Third World people versus the whites, 2) the faculty (in factions) versus the trustees (and at times the college administrators as well), 3) in lesser ways between the strikers and scabs, and 4) between students and an administration with little resources and freedom to make rapid changes in policies and programs.

These conflicts of interest were bolstered by conflicting values, such as 1) those between equality and freedom versus structure and authority, 2) liberal and radical activism versus politically pragmatic decisions and a bureaucratic administration, 3) the revolutionary versus the "pilgrim through life," 4) the "under 30" in-group versus those "over 30" (as captured in the slogan "Don't trust anyone over 30."),

5) Uncle Toms versus the first class and equal, "Black and beautiful", 6) a need for violence versus change through persuasion or mechanisms of guilt, 7) "Make love not war," 8) learning through action and involvement versus indoctrination to take one's place in the world or work (or to fit the bureaucracy), 9) student-centered learning within a loose structure versus the campus "in loco parentis", 10) the elite versus the masses, and finally 11) the suspiciousness and intolerance between the general public and the working student versus the new left.

When all of these conflicts are filtered through their respective channels a certain form of social order or non-order results. Characteristic of the time preceeding the strike was a period of experimentation which brought into being the Experimental College, but also a period in which several college presidents succeeded each other in rapid succession. A growing awareness among Blacks of the need for a Black Studies program or department as well as the realization of de facto segregation in a college set up to serve a city which is one fourth Black and a total of about fifty percent minority in ethnic composition, all this led to an open series of confrontations. The governor was of the opinion that Blacks should be trained or have their education bettered first in the Junior Colleges so as not to lower the standards of the State College. This period of rapid change, rising to turmoil, in the main led to a temporary shutting down of the college, and the succession of the presidency to Hayakawa, a pragmatic law and order man who succeeded in reestablishing the status quo and a policy and period of very gradual change, if any.

With this preliminary overview of the situation in terms of conflicting values, interests and forms of social order, it is time to present an overview of the central themes of the conceptual model. Subsequently each hypothesis will be stated in a cluster appropriate to its subject matter. With such a model available the particular facts should be more coherent and understandable.

The most directly related previous conceptual model is that of Gouldner on the functions of bureaucratic rules.(1954). Chart A gives us a picture of his analysis of what is probably the most central problem of a complex organization. Where the motivation and role performance of staff and workers is low the typical solution is for the administration to apply close supervision of their work. This leads to tensions built up in the workers and their relations with the administration. The tensions lead to the development of new rules to handle the tensions and low motivation or performance. The rules do two things. First they mitigate some of the tensions. Secondly, they increase the original problem of low motivation and role performance. The cycle continues as the model clearly demonstrates.

A very similar model was developed here on the functions and dialectic of innovation. Chart B presents this in graphic form. It shows that attempts to innovate may lead to either or both of two results, perhaps simultaneously. If the innovation attempts lead to rather complete success then there will likely be continued support of the program. But if there is partial failure (as is almost inevitably the case) this will produce tension among the participants and between administrators and participants in the program. A likely result of the tension is administrative cutback on support for the innovation, cutback on the participants' freedom to make changes. Such cutback is an example of the use of the minimax

Chart A:
ON THE FUNCTIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC RULES



Chart B:

ON THE FUNCTIONS AND DIALECTIC OF INNOVATION


Continued Support of Program
Innovation Attempts
Rather Complete Success
Partial Failure
Tension
Administrative Cutback on Innovation (and freedom to make changes) [based on minimax principle]
Regression to Bureaucratic Status Quo

principle, a favorite with many administrators. It means the basing of decisions on the desire to minimize the possibility of the maximum loss in the situation. The result will invariably be a regression to the bureaucratic status quo.

The central model of the present analysis is more complicated than those just presented. It will for this reason be introduced gradually, in stages. First, Chart C presents an overview of the four major groups of hypotheses. The numbers and letters indicate the specific hypotheses which connect some aspect of one of the four clusters to some aspect of another cluster. These hypotheses will not be stated until each of the clusters is met in turn in succeeding pages. Then the entire flow diagram will be presented later (Chart 5) together with a complete summary statement of all hypotheses in the model. As the reader willnotice, there are four columns or divisions of this overview-chart. The variables within each of those columns have some common characteristics related to the planning possibilities. The left or "problem" area are <u>not planned</u>. The second column, the"present order" is usually <u>partly planned</u>. The third column contains variables which are <u>planable</u> (though not necessarily planned in any given case). The "sources of change and attempts to change" as well as the "thrust of actions" are most amenable to planning when all variables in the model are compared. The fourth or right-hand column includes the "facilitations" or background factors which are <u>not usually planned</u> in the innovation process, except in the extremely long range.

It will be helpful at this point to remind the reader of the main events of the months of conflict. Naturally, in the interest of brevity, many facts are left out. They must wait on future elaboration. The reader is referred to the primary source for this analysis,

CHART C : OVERVIEW



11A

namely, Orrick's College in Crisis (1969). The following introductory summary of events is taken from Orrick, pp. 3-5.

PART I

Chapter I

WHY SAN FRANCISCO STATE COLLEGE?

Late in the afternoon of November 5, 1968, a group of black students presented San Francisco State College President Robert R. Smith with a list of 10 "nonnegotiable" demands (the demands are listed in app. 1). The list had already been published in the daily newspapers. Among other things, the black students ordered the college to establish at once a black studies department with 20 full-time faculty members. They insisted that the new department be controlled by its faculty and staff, free from interference by college administrators or the statewide Board of Trustees.

The students also demanded that the college accept all Negroes who apply for admission in the fall of 1969 without regard to the academic qualifications of the applicants. And they insisted that Black Panther minister of education, George Mason Murray, 22, a graduate student, be reinstated as part-time English instructor. Murray had inflamed California's political leadership and the board of trustees with speeches in which he described the American flag as "toilet paper" and said that black students should carry guns on campus to protect themselves from "racist administrators." Under orders from State College Chancellor Glenn S. Dumke, President Smith had reluctantly suspended Murray on November 1.

Unwilling to agree to all of the students' demands, President Smith offered to discuss them with the black students. They refused, insisting on a yes-or-no answer.

On November 6, the black students, their demands unmet, launched a strike against San Francisco State College. A week later, 65 faculty members joined the students on the picket lines.

In the following weeks, San Francisco State College was the scene of violence unmatched in the history of American higher education. The campus became the first to be occupied by police on a continuous basis over several months, and it was only the daily presence of 200 to 600 policemen which kept the college open from the start of the strike on November 6 to the end of the fall semester. Even so, the campus had to be closed on three occasions during late 1968. (A comment on the police is contained in app. 2.)

By the end of the semester on January 31, 1969, there had been 731 arrests on campus; more than 80 students were reported injured as they were arrested, and others were hurt and not arrested. Thirty-two policemen were injured on the campus. Damage to campus buildings exceeded $16,000; there were scores of small fires and a major one in a vice president's office. Eight bombs were planted on campus, and two firebombs were hurled at and into

the home of an assistant to the president. In mid-February, a campus guard received head injuries from a bomb that exploded at the entrance to the administration building. Three weeks later, on March 5, 1969, a 19-year-old Negro sophomore in social sciences was partially blinded and maimed when a time bomb—which police said he was installing—exploded in the Creative Arts Building. Ordnance specialists discovered two other bombs, one of them with six sticks of dynamite, in a nearby room.

But why did all this happen at San Francisco State College? San Francisco State was and is one of the most liberal institutions in this country in terms of active student participation in the administration of the affairs of the college. For example, the students controlled a budget on the order of $400,000 per year, established the first experimental college, participated in the administration of the college through student government, and enjoyed more freedom than most other college students. The administration, far from being rigid, was very flexible. Although during the 2 years preceding the strike the San Francisco State campus had been disrupted on numerous occasions by protesting and demonstrating students, these events generally, like those on other campuses, were episodes involving an issue, such as antiwar protest, or a specific campus problem.

Why, then, did the San Francisco State College strike become the first sustained assault on an institution by its students, embroiling, as it did, not only the faculty, administrators, trustees, students, and alumni, but also political leaders of the city and the State, and the off-campus community?

This report addresses itself to answering this question, and in so doing provides insights into some of the causes of the ever-growing campus protests in the United States. It focuses on the underlying reasons for the strike as they emerge from a description of the educational system and the attitudes of those involved. It presents, as objectively as possible, the attitudes of some representatives of the various groups which were embroiled in the controversy.

The first part of the report (chs. I-V) describes the California system of higher education and San Francisco State College, the conditions which obtained there prior to the strike, and the strike. Because the student strike leadership was centered in the Black Student Union, the second part of the report (ch. VI) deals with the black community and some of the reasons underlying the actions of the black student strike leaders. This is followed by a brief comment on the outlook for the future (ch. VII) and appendices containing a list of the demands (app. 1), a comment on the police (app. 2), a list of the trustees of the California State colleges (app. 3), and a summary of the proposed Black Studies Program (app. 4).

We begin with a description of San Francisco State College.

We must first begin our analysis with the current order of things in October, 1968. A liberal faculty and students with a comparatively high degree of influence and participation in the administration of the affairs of the college found themselves faced with a list of 10 "nonnegotiable" demands from the Black Students Union. The demands were as follows (Orrick, 1969: p. 157):

TEN DEMANDS OF THE BLACK STUDENTS UNION

1. That all black studies courses being taught through various other departments be immediately part of the black studies department and that all instructors in this department receive full time pay.
2. That Dr. Hare, chairman of the black studies department, receive a full professorship and a comparable salary according to his qualifications.
3. That there be a department of black studies which will grant a bachelor's degree in black studies; that the black studies department chairman, faculty, and staff have the sole power to hire and fire without the interference of the racist administration and the chancellor.
4. That all unused slots for black students from fall 1968 under the special admissions program be filled in spring 1969.
5. That all black students who wish to, be admitted in fall 1969.
6. That 20 full-time teaching positions be allocated to the department of black studies.
7. That Dr. Helen Bedesem be replaced in the position of financial aid officer and that a black person be hired to direct it and that Third World people have the power to determine how it will be administered.
8. That no disciplinary action will be administered in any way to any students, workers, teachers, or administrators during and after the strike as a consequence of their participation in the strike.
9. That the California State College Trustees not be allowed to dissolve any black programs on or off the San Francisco State College campus.
10. That George Murray maintain his teaching position on the campus for the 1968-69 academic year.

The essence of the demands centers around the establishment of a large Black Studies Department. The lack of immediate action on the part of administrators led to a strike, or refusal to attend classes on the part of sympathetic students. Other students felt threatened by the strikers, and thus did not attend classes for fear of personal danger. Many incidents of malicious mischief, violence, arrests and injuries followed, as well as a raging controversy among the public and the trustees. A new college president succeeded, and only some of the demands were partially granted over a relatively long period of time.

The social order of the college at the time could be characterized as progressive. Here was an activist or militant faction presenting not altogether unreasonable demands. But they were (as Orrick points out) hindered by a slow-moving bureaucratic system controlled from a distance to an unreasonable degree by the trustees, the legislature and the governor. The bureaucratic inefficiency existed even in comparison to other large universities, including the big sister system of the University of California. As usual, the administrators were caught in the middle. And students who wanted to continue their education in the normal manner ended up the major victims of the immediate crisis. Further, the aggrieved Blacks ended up in a position probably less well off than when they started. If students had had <u>less</u> of an influence to start with, such incidents and violence might very well not have happened. But the risk of some degree of democratic influence gave hope to the aggrieved for some results following from their demands. By overstating their case and acting irrationally at times and being practically unaware of the heavy outside bureaucratic influences on the college administration and faculty,

the petitioning and demanding students found themselves victims once again of the system. The particular kind of social problem is one of being so close to achieving one's needs, but yet so far. It is a case of relative deprivation, in this case a deprivation of educational parity.

Hypotheses and Model: Cluster 1

For a collection of all hypotheses and the accompanying flow chart (Chart 5) see pp. . The starting point for the analysis is the "present social order", labeled the "new order," which is necessarilly viewed as only a "temporary solution" or state of affairs. Each such social order encounters certain problems and conflicts as a normal matter of course.

The first major group (among the four groups) of hypotheses are those dealing with what are primarily latent and intrinsic background matters. At least in the present context they are for all practical purposes unplanned and uninstitutionalized. They focus on the substance of actual problems, including conflicts and crises. These include hypotheses 1A through 1J. See Chart 1. The cluster includes the following concepts: 1) organizational rigidity, 2) problems (of any kind between or within parties, levels of the organization, etc.), 3) value conflict (defined as difference of attitude and sentiment), 4) interest conflict (defined as difference or disagreement on resources necessary for the survival of one group or another), 5) mistrust, and 6) crisis. A crisis is a significant rift or upset in the relationships within the organization, functioning of operations within the organization, conduct of day-to-day business. These crises range from so simple a matter as a demonstration, march, petition over a grievance that is widely felt and supported, even up to the severity of a strike, revolt, "take-over" (say of buildings by

Chart 1


Organizational Rigidity
1B
1C
Value Conflict
1D
Interest Conflict
1E
Problems
1A
(New) Order
1F
1G
Mistrust
1H
Crisis
1I
Unplanned
Partly Planned

students.

Due to space limitations, and since the chief purpose here is to illustrate the possible utility of the systems model and hypotheses, full details of the illustrative case are not given. Ideally, the reader would have some degree of familiarity with the actual events of the crisis (say from reading Orrick's volume). To our knowledge, no systematic chronology of events exists. This would be a very desirable aid to understanding the crisis in context. Finally, all of the hypotheses are based on the mutatis mutandis assumption in the context of attempted innovation in a large-scale organization. The numbering of the hypotheses corresponds to the numbering of arrows in the flow diagrams. The numbering remains uniform from one chart to the next. Each arrow and each number and letter correspond to one hypothesis in the text.

Hypothesis 1A: The presently existing form of social order produces or facilitates certain kinds of social problems. There are characteristic and situational problems associated with any given form of social order. The progressive social order facilitated the problem of the Black Students' overeagerness for change. Despite being progressive, it was apparently also true that the previous five years saw a decline of Black enrollment at S. F. State, though no statistics were kept.

Hyp. 1B: The present form of social order (whatever it be) also contains, produces or facilitates certain varieties of organizational rigidity (and conservative weaknesses). Rigidity invariably occurs in the process of attempting to consolidate or preserve gains or at least to preserve one's relatively favorable position. Certainly the organizational rigidity that already existed in the college system was uncovered for the observation of anyone interested. The inability

of the administration of the college or the president to act without a long series of meetings with the chancellor and the trustees, as well as the line-item budget prevented transfer of funds from other offices (however unused the other funds might be), and promoted the inability to act or even to negotiate with any binding force with those who brought their grievances to the administration. The strike and the unfortunate accompanying incidents of violence (many of which were overpublicized) represented a breakdown of the social order for those in power and produced a change in regime (the Hayakawa presidency). The new regime continued the conservative weakness of a go-slow policy in dealing with the legitimate needs and grievances of the Black students and their supporting Black community leaders in San Francisco. Hayakawa went along with the trustees as a hard-line gradualist.

Hyp. 1C: Organizational rigidity leads to conflicts of interest. A conflict of interest is a difference between partisans based on their needs for the means of survival, especially when the resources to fulfill those needs are scarce. The rigidity of the line-item budget and the control of major items of policy and funding from the trustees office and the State legislature lead in the present instance to an overt conflict first between students and administrators, then between the administrators and the regents and governor. All along there was a conflict between faculty and the trustees and legislature over such things as teaching load and salary, research funds and support of new programs and fringe benefits. It may truly be said that these conflicts of interest rigidified the organization. Mechanisms for dealing with them were either non-existent or ineffective.

The desire of the trustees to keep things quiet on the campus in order not to jeopordize funding from the legislature (which would be under pressure from the general public to reduce funding to

schools where there was trouble), led them to take a hard line against demands of the activist students, especially the Blacks. Whether giving in to the demands would have led to a more quiet atmosphere on campus is also in doubt since accession to "demands" is liable to lead to more demands and a kind of rule by threat of strike or violence. Still there must have been ways to avoid some of the blunders on the part of all parties, including the San Francisco police on certain occasions. In particular, the police once lost radio contact (for apparently technical reasons) with a couple of their detectives. They marched in to the "rescue," thus becoming willy-nilly a symbolic threat to the students in their path. This promptly led to an outbreak of violence between students and police.

1D: Conflict of values (or ideologies, especially between the elite and the masses, or management and workers) leads to conflict of interest. Many conflicts of values and conflicts of interest are listed above on pp. 6-7. It seems that the conflicts of values primarily served to bolster if not to initiate the conflicts of interest. It seems that there are conflicts of interest between at least four pairs of parties or interest groups. 1) The Blacks were seeking better job opportunity, education, pride in self through a Black Studies Department. The Whites were mostly seeking an education for a better job. A minority of white students were eager to participate in war protest, or new life styles. As students a majority could be said to be interested in solving social problems. White administrators were interested in maintaining a progressive reputation with gradual change in programs. The trustees (who were of course all white) were for gradual progress, but motivated to encapsulate activist students. 2) There was also a conflict between faculty and trustees (and to some extent between faculty and administrators). The interests of the faculty included the desire for better facilities, working

conditions, course load, teaching assistants, freedom from political interference, freedom to exercise the critical function on social issues, a decentralization of authority to the department level, as well as a voice in statewide college policy. There were also the beginnings of the movement to seek a collective bargaining agreement and a negotiated contract. At odds with these wishes of the faculty were the goals of the trustees, which seemed to center around the cost-effective production of degrees, a non-political school image, betterment of business prospects, and the maintenance of the final authority in the trustees themselves. There was also the related problem of the control exercised by the now distant chancellor (Dumke).

3) A further conflict of interest existed between the strikers and scabs. The strikers included first the Black students who were joined by the TWLF (Third World Liberation Front), other agitators and seekers after "kicks", those who enjoyed agitation and protest for its own sake, as well as faculty in support of minority rights and some faculty (65 AFT union members who seemed at least partly motivated by a desire for better working conditions, staff support, and a union contract which the faculty never possessed). The scabs were mostly working students whose interest was mainly job advancement only, as well as those faculty members who felt a duty to protect the rights of the non-protesting students, in addition to those faculty who were satisfied with the status quo, and inevitably some with racist views (or so it may safely be surmised).

4) A final significant conflict of interest occurred between students and the administration. The students were primarily those working for the swift implementation of the Black Studies Department along with their hangers-on. Their interests were spelled out in

their list of demands. At odds with them were the administration spokesmen whose interest was to satisfy the legitimate needs of the majority of students within the strict and admittedly cumbersome system of bureaucratic rules.

The most immediately relevant conflict of values was that between 1) the Blacks who saw themselves as worthy of first class citizenship (specifically, equal opportunity) at the present moment, and 2) the white establishment members (notably the trustees and the chancellor) who felt that everyone should and could work his own way up the system ladder so long as he was willing to work hard enough. The primary conflict of interest that resulted or at least was associated with this state of affairs was the need of Blacks for better education, particularly about their own history and culture. They conceived this, and rightly so, as their due. The values of the administrators were the values of following the bureaucratic procedures themselves in obedience to higher authorities. Their alternative would be to break precedent at the risk of their own jobs. They would immediately be called into account by the chancellor's office if they did break the rules, and the trustees, legislature and governor would likely have seen to it that they were dismissed. Furthermore, the tone of the Black Student Union "demands" was so strident and "bullheaded" that to capitulate immediately would be to show weakness. The very use of term "demands" instead of "requests" or "motions" indicates the "bullheadedness." It seems that if the demands were put as urgent requests, and accompanied by an offer to give whatever administrative support necessary to satisfy official channels, and to assure the quality of the Black Studies Department, then they may have had a fighting chance to make some progress in their fight. In fact, there was already in the works a plan to set up such a department. It would have come, and with less difficulty for all

concerned, if there had been more cool and rational approaches taken by the petitioners. The administration would have to take some of the blame for not sufficiently advertising the progress being made in the establishment of the new department.

Hyp. 1E: Interest conflict leads to social problems. By way of clarification, we conceive of conflict as normal. It becomes a problem for unusual concern only when so defined by either party, especially when it is made a public issue. The chief interest conflict in broader perspective can be seen as that between Black students on the one hand, and on the other the white administrators, faculty, trustees and an overwhelming majority of working white students. The overt social problem to be dealt with was de facto segregation and discrimination, otherwise known as racism. There seems to be a mutual reinforcement between the conflict of interest and the social problem of racism. But to illustrate the hypothesis explicitly, it is certain that the vested interests of the white majority in the college reinforced if it did not create the shades of racism.

Hyp. 1F: Value conflict leads to mistrust between the parties. The strident expressions of the newly reborn Black power movement coming into conflict with a working class white mobility ladder (as embodied in the educational system) only served to create a strong mistrust on the part of the public of California. They had fears of further violence, fears of the loss of the quality of the instruction, and finally a backlash of the politically rightist in the state. The Black community of San Francisco as well as the other Third World community members and many white liberal citizens of the local community around the college supported the Black demands. These people were then in conflict with the large majority of the

remainder of the California public. As residents of a liberal voting city, the citizens of San Francisco found themselves suspicious as always, and in a sense distrustful of the rest of the California public on the major issues of the crisis.

Hyp. 1G: Mistrust leads to social problems. The mistrust between the California voter and the militant Blacks added to the social problem of racism by generating a backlash against the needs of the Black students and the Black community.

Hyp. 1H: Social problems lead to certain crises in social (and organizational) relationships. The problem of unsolved racism led to the strike and other incidents. There was malicious mischief on the part of many students, mostly white students. There was the Black attack apparently aided by the Black instructor, G. Murray, on the Gator (the college) newspaper editor on November 6, 1967, the suspension of G. Murray, and incidents involving overreaction at times on the part of the otherwise restrained and well-trained San Francisco police. (G. Murray was also coordinator of the student-run ghetto tutorial program, a graduate student with a part-time teaching post in the English department, a Black Panther, who was also serving six months for parole violation (at the time ?).) The crisis was supported further in the background by the denial by the trustees of the permission to build the new student union building with funds put up entirely by the students and backed by a prize-winning architectural design. The latter arbitrary decision (said to be based on lack of safety of window design) represented a crisis in the organizational structure of the college, and resulted from the authoritarian structure of the college. It was further reinforced by the parental view the trustees held with regard to students generally, especially in light of the fact that the trustees had

little or no contact with students, at this campus or any other in the system.

Hyp. 1I: This hypothesis will be treated after section 2 (pg.).

Hyp. 1J: Conflict of interest leads to conflict of values. This is the reciprocal of Hyp. 1D. It is clear for example that the Blacks' interest in a Black Studies Department as opposed to the administrators' interest in maintaining the bureaucratic decision-making system lead to a hightening of many conflicts of values, such as 1) those between equality and freedom versus structure and authority, or 2) the Uncle Toms versus the "Black and beautiful".

Cluster 2

The second major cluster of hypotheses are those dealing with the thrust and direction of the response to some crisis. These are actions taken by the initiators in the innovation or resistance processes, including opinions, strategic moves and demands. These factors are amenable to a certain degree of planning on the part of participants and change agents. Included are hypotheses 2A through 2G. The concepts in this cluster are 1) the demand for change, 2) the demand for the status quo, 3) a solid public opinion (This means solidified into discernible partisan groups which support some policy on the present crisis.), 4) an end (defined as termination of action by an administrator or a given attempt by the reformers to communicate to influence him). See Chart 2 for flow diagram of the relationships between these concepts.

Hyp. 2A: Crises in social relationships lead to demands for change. Such demands may be made by individuals, organizations or movements. The slow movement toward a Black Studies Department (against a

Chart 2



Plausible

background of the denial of the student union) represented a severe crisis in the organizational structure. This led in turn to demands for change, the ten demands of the Black Students Union, and the additional five demands of the TWLF (Orrick, 1969: p. 157).

FIVE DEMANDS OF THE THIRD WORLD LIBERATION FRONT

1. That schools of ethnic studies for the ethnic groups involved in the Third World be set up, with students for each particular organization having the authority and the control of the hiring and retention of any faculty member, director, and administrator, as well as the curricula.
2. That 50 faculty positions be appropriated to the schools of ethnic studies, 20 of which would be for the black studies program.
3. That in the spring semester the college fulfill its commitments to the nonwhite students in admitting those that apply.
4. That in the fall of 1969, all applications of nonwhite students be accepted.
5. That George Murray and any other faculty members chosen by nonwhite people as their teachers be retained in their positions.

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The lack of an effective faculty voice in their own governance led to unionization and demands for change, especially by the more activist AFT (American Federation of Teachers). And the SDS (Students for Democratic Society) who seemed to feel the irrelevance of the system more than others, created their own brand of malicious mischief as well as leading a boycott of the school cafeteria for lack of good food.

It is of course also true that from the point of view of the Black activists a crisis had occurred in their social position and opportunity at S. F. State. It consisted, it seems, of declining Black enrollment in the previous five years and the slow response (in their eyes) of the administration to anticipate their needs and to respond to their present demands.

Hyp. 2B: Crises lead to solidification of public opinion (at least into distinguishable factions). The various crises centering

around the Strike of the Black Students Union brought support to their side from the TWLF as well as the Black community of San Francisco. This community of interests took on the characteristics of a solidified faction of public opinion. The working white students generally were against the strike, and certainly the California public by all indications was overwhelmingly against it. The faculty was divided. Most unified of all it seems were the trustees who eventually got their way.

There are certain possible alternatives to hypotheses 2A and 2B. If a crisis does not lead to either A) a demand for change, or B) a solid public opinion, then we might expect some such outcomes as apathy, inaction, a proliferation of petty or tricial crises, or latent ill-will, general anxiety which may provide the background for some later, more serious crises. This state of affairs, or some combination along these lines will not necessarily lead to new crises of a serious nature. It may only indicate that the social or organizational system has a tolerance for unsolved problems, or that the crisis was not really so serious after all, or that the grievants or reformers or "revolutionaries" were not well enough organized or numerous enough, or did not have the support of a large enough proportion of the relevant general public.

Hypothesis 2C: The existence of a solid block of public opinion leads to demsnds (to leaders) for change. Very briefly, the public sector represented by the Black community supported the demands of the Black Student Union.

Hyp. 2D: The existence of a solid block of public opinion leads to confirmation (to leaders) of the desire for the status quo. The California public outside of San Francisco was overwhelmingly

in favor of the status quo and law and order even if it required strong police action against unruly students, particularly the Black strike organizers.

Hyp. 2E: Demands for change tend to reach the elite. President Smith of the College received the list of ten demands in no uncertain terms. As it happened the newspapers had printed them before President Smith received them. Naturally enough it was not long before Chancellor Dumke, the trustees and Governor Reagan also read the demands.

Hyp. 2F: Demands for the status quo will also be communicated to the elite. When President Smith closed the campus down (on November 13) in fear of further outbreaks of violence, Governor Reagan and Assembly Speaker Unruh criticized the decision. How much evidence exists of the public's desire to open the campus immediately is not known. But it can be safely assumed that there was some pressure in this direction. It is also not unreasonable to assume that the Governor and regents were acting on a law and order principle which in the immediate dangers of the campus situation could well be viewed by the police and responsible administrators as a further provocation to violence, mischief and incidents of protest. While the governor probably sized up the California public's desire correctly on this point, at least in principle, the safety of all concerned immediately on campus, and the political strategy for gaining a peace with justice for all parties made highly suspect the immediate move from afar to reopen the campus.

Hyp. 2G: Communication to the elite may be officially ignored (for political purposes or out of fear of change in the social order).

The demands for a Black Studies department had been going through bureaucratic channels, which was seen by the eager Blacks as an ignorance or turning away from their demands. In fact, their demands were listened to by the President but could only be implemented through a long bureaucratic process like any other organizational innovation in such a tall bureaucracy as this. There was also continual and long-standing ignoring in effect of Black demands by the trustees and the legislature of a series of financial needs of the college. The trustees in effect also ignored the plans for the student union. The frequent changes in presidency of the college increased the probability that certain petitions and issues would be dropped, i.e., effectively ignored.

Hyp. 1I: If communication to the elite is officially ignored on an important issue, it will lead to a new crisis or a reinforcement of the old. Although the need for Black Studies Department was not technically ignored, it was not implemented with great dispatch. Hence followed the ten demands of the Black Student's Union. In some ways their demands were evidently a publicity-seeking action. The timing of the presentation of the demands, namely, the presentation of the list to President SMith after they had been printed in the newspapers betrays the motive of publicity. The succeeding strike action by the Black Students represented a new crisis beyond the need for a Black Studies department. This also brought to a head the racist crisis senses by the Blacks, as evidenced by the declining Black enrollments in the previous couple of years (which followed the new requirement of scores on the College Aptitude Test in addition to standing in one's graduating class from high school).

* At this point we have treated enough hypotheses to point out a vicious circle composed of a combination of the following hypotheses: 1D, 1E, 1H, 2A, 2E, 2G, 1I, 2A, and then beginning again at 2E. This can be seen as another elaboration upon Gouldner's vicious circle on the function of bureaucratic rules.

A more detailed illustration of the cycle of crisis, demands, planning, change, new problems and new crises is the following quotation which describes a meeting of the faculty in a crucial meeting shortly after the strike began.(Orrick, 1969: pp. 58-60).

> Throughout the turmoil of the fall semester, traditional faculty governance mechanisms seemed woefully ill equipped to meet the challenges of this novel crisis.
>
> As the strike progressed, the other parties to the problem—especially striking students and the trustees—seemed to regard the faculty and faculty senate meetings, actions and proposals as irrelevant. An observer from the Washington based American Council on Education describes a portion of a November 19 faculty meeting:
>
> > In all faculty and senate meetings, we were impressed by the obsession with parliamentary procedure, with nitpicking and endless points of order. (

order. [One informant maintained that this was the only weapon left to the moderates.]

As soon as Bob Smith finished speaking, Chairman McClatchy suggested that he would entertain a vote of confidence in the president. At this point, a sequence of events occurred which must be described in detail because it reveals so much of the spirit of SFSC and its faculty.

1. Motion and second for vote of confidence in Smith.
2. Point of order: Such a motion must go to the Committee on Resolutions, which has already established the order of the day, and hence this is out of order.
3. Chair overrules the point of order.
4. Motion [angrily put] and many seconds to overrule the chair.
5. Chair calls for a voice vote. Yeas and nays judged equal.
6. Call for a division.
7. While the yeas begin to stand, microphone seized for a point of order: Nonvoting faculty and students judged to be voting.
8. Chairman says he cannot sort out 1,000 people by sight, asks for suggestions. Suggested that the hall be cleared and that only voting faculty be readmitted. Much groaning. Hall cleared for 15 minute recess.
9. Faculty begin going back in, showing passes to *two* campus police guards.
10. Meantime, side doors and stage doors are thrown open, and students and nonvoters go streaming back down the aisles and even on stage. (I asked the guard why he let obvious BSU members in. Guard: "Listen, one of them told me that I'd better let them in or I'd get my head busted. I ain't about to argue with thirty colored boys, so I let'em in!")
11. Result: Audience in exactly the same state, but now angry and swelled in ranks by militant students attracted to the fray.. From this point on, all voice votes "tainted."
12. Many motions to adjourn, not debatable. All noisily shouted down, sometimes without a formal vote. (Two faculty members walk by me in the doorway, white with anger, explaining to a third, "Mob rule.")
13. Finally, by an overwhelming voice vote, agreement to reconvene next day in general session for a convocation and for open debate between the president and the BSU leadership about "what is possible."
14. Adjournment, followed by a call for a faculty senate meeting in the front of the auditorium. Black students sitting at the front refuse to move, say they will have to be carried out.
15. The senate (about half its members) give up and move to a small conference room in the library building.

In the climate of confusion in the following days, Smith's plan to reopen the campus through a series of convocations faltered. The campus was in limbo—neither open nor closed. Attempts to hold classes were met by striking students, first with protests, and later with disruptions. Much of the time was spent with the faculty denouncing the trustees, and the students denouncing the existing system of education.

> The convocation failed, despite urging the support from San Francisco Mayor Alioto. The Governor criticized the holding of the convocations, and the trustees expressed anger that the faculty had not fully returned to work; they considered the convocation just another delaying tactic.
>
> In an exchange of November 25, BSU spokesman Jerry Varnado called President Smith a "pig," further reducing chances that the all-college meeting would produce a solution to the strike.

On November 26 the trustees held a meeting in Los Angeles attended by President Smith. Smith was in a bind about keeping order on campus despite the insistence of the trustees that the campus be opened. Without prelude, Smith at one point interjected into the conversation: "Gentlemen, I will save you a lot of trouble here——I resign!"

Cluster 3

The third major cluster of hypotheses relate the institutionalized or institutionalizable sources, channels and inspiration for change, as they are available to the initiators of change, in the context of the normal mode of changing of plans and procedures in a complex organization. These sources and relationships are centered around the most planable issues encompassed by the present model. The concepts included entirely within this cluster include 1) communication to the elite, 2) the practical plan (and attempts to implement it, 3) reform proposals (from any source) (The reasonableness of the proposals is judged primarily by the administrators, a conservative elite, and the majority of public opinion.), 4) a self study seminar (involving as many levels in the university hierarchy as possible), and 5) the reformers' hope of success.

A self-study seminar in the university (an idea suggested by Harold Lasswell, 1969 lecture) would consist of an interdisciplinary seminar to study the workings of the college and its system, including relationships between and among students, faculty, staff, administrators,

Chart 3


Reformers' Hope of Success
3A
Reform Proposals
3F
Self-Study Seminar
3G
3H
3B
3C
3D
3E
Practical Plan
Communication to Elite

trustees, legislators, governor and the general public. It would be given for credit for both faculty and students, and offered each semester in order to provide continuity of interest and continuous data production, analysis and policy recommendations.

See chart 3 for a flow diagram of the relationships between the concepts just introduced.

Hyp. 3A: In the degree to which reformers have hope of success they will more likely present reform proposals. It seems that the BSU was so convinced of the justice of their proposals that they had high hopes of success in procuring their wishes. It is true also that not all of the BSU members wanted the demands to be presented as "non-negotiable". A majority vote of the members did, and the others went along. This was probably a tactical mistake given the intractability of any bureaucracy and the inability to overrule most policies even on the part of the president of the college.

The source of the reformers' hope for success is not crucial to the present hypothesis (3A). However, it may come from early socialization, optimistic traits of personality, religious or quasi-religious esprit de corps, confidence in the movement for civil rights, conviction of the justice of one's cause, or even naivete or ignorance of the bleakness of the real facts.

Hyp. 3B: The more reasonable reform proposals that are put forward a) the more likely practical plans for change will be (at least implicitly) proposed, and b) the more attempts there will be at implementation. Not all of the BSU's ten demands were considered reasonable by other parties. And the same holds true of the TWLF's five demands. It takes a great deal of experience with bureaucratic mechanisms to formulate valid proposals or ones that are workable given the many reviews of each item given by officials on the hierarchy. There were, to be sure, more proposals than

there were reasonable proposals made. There were certainly fewer practical plans than proposals, and hence even fewer attempts at implementation. It takes little planning and little energy and effort to state demands in one or two lines each. But to plan an entire budget, allot funds, to hire people competent to fit all positions, to set up a curriculum and a schedule of classes, all these require weeks and months of work by many people working together. It seems that Nathan Harewas hired to design a curriculum of Black Studies and that considerable progress had been made in that direction (pp. 128ff.). The chronology of progress was apparently unknown to either the BSU or the appropriate college officials at the time of the presentation of the demands. If these facts had been more widely known a more reasonable atmosphere for negotiation could have been established. But hindsight is not enough.

Hyp. 3C: The more frequent and cogent the communication to the elite, the more likely reform proposals will be put forward. The BSU apparently had little if any contact with the president or administration before the presentation of their demands. They seem not to have even had contact with Nathan Hare who according to the usual rules of protocol should have been their mediator to the administration. Whether there was such contact, and if not, why not, remain highly crucial questions in assessing the total chain of events during these months of crisis. A few months before the strike (April 29, 1968) Nathan Hare had presented "A Conceptual Proposal for a Department of Black Studies" (pp. 165-173), giving his overall plan step-by-step. The precipitous nature of the BSU demands is betrayed by the existence of this prior, reasonable proposal, which was to all intents and purposes being gradually implemented. The Proposal was

cogent and contained many reform proposals within it. The BSU by all available evidence went in to the President with its demands without prior notice, without significant previous communication, and hence with almost inevitably less than completely reasonable reform proposals.

Hyp. 3D: The presence of a self-study seminar will lead to communication of relatively more valid information (evidence, plans, proposals, wishes and demands) to the elite. The nearest thing to a self-study seminar (other than the BSU's own meetings) were the proposed arbitrators for the strike, and then the Concerned Citizens Committee (pp. 72ff) composed of 21 members including labor leaders, businessmen, and clergymen. The problem was in part that that committee was without staff and without funds, not to mention withoug even negotiating power. It was thus ineffectual, at best a recommending body with little more weight than that of the results of a public opinion poll. It was seen by many, and not without justification, as a screen capable of drawing off energy from the real issues, under the appearance of achieving something towards a solution to the pressing problems at hand. Students and other community leaders were brought in to swell the size of the committee to an unwieldly 39 members, thus further obviating the possibility of effective discussion. Besides, these were only discussions and not negotiations in any sense of the term (pg. 73).

At one point a scheduled meeting was canceled between four trustees and George Johns, executive secretary of the Central Labor Council, who brought together the Committee of Concerned Citizens with the active support of Mayor Alioto. Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Theodore Meriam, canceled it at the instigation of the Governor and some of the Trustees (perhaps to indicate

that they were hard-liners). Johns felt that the AFT faculty strike could have been settled if that meeting had only been held. Here is then another example of communication to the elite being terminated arbitrarily and perpetuating the crisis. The exact relation of the AFT strike to that of the BSU strike is unclear from the available source material. The AFT strike was sanctioned however by the Labor Council for reasons other than student problems. The AFT had apparently enough grievances of their own. But there was undoubtedly strong sympathy with the BSU which led them to act when they did, although they represented only a small minority of teachers. Their strike however meant that essential services such as deliveries, garbage collection, and other work on campus by union employees would stop (pg. 69).

In the absence of a workable self-study seminar representing the views of all parties and administrative levels there could hardly be valid or reliable investigation of issues, let alone communication of valid information and evidence to the elite. Seminars or study groups or discussion without credit or payoff for the members generally turns out to be an exchange of opinion without sound justification. The business of research and serious study of evidence and issues is too difficult a process to hold the interests of any but the devoted, the independently wealthy, or those paid to do it. There was no study of racism on campus previous to, let alone after, the strike, nor any serious studies of organizational procedures, policies and weaknesses. In the absence of such, the communication to the elite in the first instance could not have been well informed. The need for ongoing, institutionally accredited self-study seminars in universities should be apparent. They may of course be critical or threatening to administrators of a more

conservative stripe.

Hyp. 3E: The elite is more likely to communicate (and communicate smoothly) with a (/an organizationally approved) self-study seminar than with politically oriented or one-sided block representatives. President Smith and even the trustees would inevitably have had to respond more favorably to well-reasoned proposals based on evidence than to the raw "demands" of the strikers. Although the strikers' rhetoric and many cogent facts (stated in oral arguments) were compelling in many instances, still the context of their presentation and diplomatic ill-timing militated against the quality of communication received in return from the elite, notably from the President and the trustees. The representativeness of the BSU was not established or recognized, least of all in the beginning of the crisis. Later it turned out that they had strong backing from the surrounding Black community. But still they had more slogans and emotion-laden facts than reasoned evidence and argument.

Hyp. 3F: A self-study seminar will produce acceptable reform proposals and practical plans more readily than will politically motivated or one-sided block representatives. In the present case this hypothesis must stand as an untried alternative since no genuine self-study seminar was ever established at S. F. State regarding the internal and external operation of the College. There were only politically motivated and largely one-sided block representatives. Practically speaking, the only practical plan was that developed by Nathan Hare.

Hyp. 3G: An independently-conducted self-study seminar will be a factor in creating mutual trust between the conflicting parties or blocks. There is no telling whether this is true since there was no such seminar. The nearest thing to it was the Committee of

Concerned Citizens, which as we have seen was powerless.

Hyp. 3H: A prior mutual trust between parties will facilitate the setting up of a self-study seminar. Probably no one ever thought of setting up such a seminar. And if they had it would have probably been limited in practice to one or two faculty members and some students, rather than procuring broad participation from all administrative levels. In the beginning, under the best of circumstances there would have been mistrust between for example administrators and Black students of the more militant variety. Data gathering for such a seminar would naturally involve interviews of administrators as well as students. When questioned by an interviewer, those at a higher level of power than the interfiewer would likely have become suspicious or wary of revealing their true feelings. They would be more inclined to emit politically favorable imagery as a basis for publishable statements despite any guarantees made of anonymity. For reasons such as these it seems that historical and documentary chronologies are probably the best, or at least most available sources of data for an internal self-study. Survey data and interview protocols with other than neutral content are less likely to elicit valid data.

Cluster 4

The fourth major group of hypotheses attempts to systematically relate some background facilitating conditions and mechanisms of change in both the organizational and social psychological spheres. Most of these variables are not normally planned, at least in the short range. And in some cases they are not planable at all (such as for mutual trust). Technically, at least in some grand

design, they are partly and potentially open to planned change. Included here are hypotheses 4A through 4E. The concepts in this cluster are 1) early socialization (and social personality needs), 2) mutual trust, 3) leadership of reform (which either represents the genuine interests of the reformers or is self-styled, i.e., leadership assumed by a person or small clique without a broad base of support), 4) purchasing power (especially regarding student tuition), and 5) profit sharing. The latter term is based on the notion borrowed from industrial finance. Here it has its counterpart or analog in the payoff received by 1) the student, and 2) the sponsors, such as administration, financiers and the general public who are concerned with this particular educational institution. The payoff to both parties should be greater in the long run if the student learns more as a result of healthy innovation. If innovation is very much circumscribed by administrative rules or inhibitions the talents of students will be less likely to be well used. The result then can only be a long-run loss for their sponsors as well. See Chart 4 for a flow diagram of the relationships between these concepts.

Hyp. 4A: If each person has at least a minimum acceptable level of purchasing power (with say a tuition grant based on his ability and then his desire for an education) this will lead to the institutionalization of voting equality (between citizens, whether they be members of the elite or the lower echelons). There did not exist more than the bare minimum of purchasing power for most Blacks in San Francisco. They were forced by the fact living in a certain neighborhood to go to (what were by all available evidence) inferior schools which could not bring out their ability. And when their abilities were not being used they could only lose the desire to gain further formal education. Or else they might make

Chart 4


Early Socialization
4H
Mutual Trust
4B
4F
4D
4E
Leadership of Reform
4C
4G
Voting (Equality)
4A
Purchasing Power
4I
Profit Sharing
Not Usually Planned

strident demands, as actually happened for some of those comparatively few who had made it to S. F. State). Instead most Blacks were shunted off to a Junior College if they got that far. As a group, and on the average, their real ability was likely never tapped. As a result, it could not be said that they possessed voting equality over their educational destiny or other important decisions made about them in the city of San Francisco. This state of affairs is further indicated by the fact that they were unable to gain sufficient help to raise their abilities to capacity, nor even to gain entrance to S. F. State. The small number of Black representatives to the state legislature, or even the scarcity of Black administrators and teachers in the College could not validly be taken as evidence for the Blacks' lack of native ability. If anything, it only showed the lack of proper cultivation of their abilities based in part on their lack of purchasing power. Furthermore, it is unlikely (in an environment of capitalism and a group spirit approaching rugged individualism, as is still to some extent the case in America today) that purchasing power, including the power of purchasing educational equality could ever be reached without voting equality, and vice versa. White popular demand for Black equality is apparently more altruistic than realistic. Here is the dilemma so well recognized by the BSU, but seen only dimly if at all by the far-off trustees.

Hyp. 4B: Mutual trust between conflicting parties facilitates the institutionalization of voting equality. Voting equality (in the larger community) in this case might have been demonstrated by a somewhat unworkable proposal such as presenting the question of a Black Studies Department in a Third World College to the voters of San Francisco. Since the voters are half Third World members it

would have been highly interesting to see the results of such a vote or even a public opinion poll. For valid pedagogical reasons such a poll could not be held as binding on educational policy makers. But the results would indeed be telling. Although Blacks and whites in San Francisco have voting equality at the polls, they do not have it in regard to the schools they must attend. And this is the heart of the present issue. There was no doubt suspicion based on a history of racial inequalities and a lack of mutual trust between Blacks and whites. There were as well the arguments of reverse discrimination. To deprive some white children access to the nearest school that would result from busing them to a poorer quality school in a Black or Third World neighborhood is also discriminatory. Thus, a history of lack of mutual trust by minority races and whites, and the existing unequal system prohibited voting equality in this sense of the term.

Hyp. 4C: Voting equality promotes a representative reform leadership. There was no equality in the vote for a Black Studies Department because there was no vote. The reform leadership was embodied in Nathan Hare who handled the job responsibly (by all available indications). He represented the acceptable leadership for reform in the eyes of the administrators and trustees. But in fact the speed with which he was able to move his proposals did not represent the wishes of the petitioning Black students of the BSU.

Hyp. 4D: Representative reform leadership is more likely to be acceptable to the elite (organization or government leaders) than will self-styled leadership. The leadership of the BSU was self-styled though in practice not so far from the wishes of the Black community

of San Francisco. Nathan Hare represented the establishment or the official leadership of reform. Through no apparent fault of his own he was unable to speed the process as the large majority of the Black community would no doubt have preferred. His proposals were being gradually implemented according to his own schedule. His ideas then were acceptable to the college elite, i.e., the administration. But the BSU for reasons of their own attempted to force the issue by going over the head of Nathan Hare. The result was the precipitation of chaos and turmoil for several months.

Hyp. 4E: Representative reform leadership will likely spend more time in effective communication with the elite than will self-styled leadership. Certainly Nathan Hare communicated more with the administration of the College than did the BSU.

Hyp. 4F: Representative reform leadership is more lilely to favor and promote the institutionalization of self-study seminars. There is no evidence on this point from the present case since no self-study seminars existed.

Hyp.4G:Mutual trust between parties will facilitate the possibility of voting equality. Evidence is lacking here also since there did not seem to be any change in the voting equality or representativeness of views even with regard to the citizen's choice of college and program of studies. There was a Black Studies Department (or rather program) however, though not in any sense as a result of the demands of the Black people or of the BSU. There did exist a minimum, or perhaps on the whole a high degree, of trust in most Black students among the administrators at the College. They even had an appreciation for the abilities and high academic

as well as political talents of many of their Black students. But it was the administrators and their obligation towards the Blacks rather than the existence of effective Black power which in the nature of things allowed the new quasi-department to come into existence. The Balcks at best were mere petitioners for their cause.

Hyp. 4H: Early socialization, including traditions and the meshing of social personality needs of each party strongly influence the degree of mutual trust between them. As noted above, a history of early childhood socialization, traditions of discrimination and the lack of meshing of social personality needs on the part of the trustees on the one hand and the Black petitioners on the other created and maintained the lack of trust between them throughout the affair.

Remaining linkages

Certain additional hypotheses could be stated in order to help fill in the gaps and complete the cycle of logic necessary for a rounded theory. The following hypotheses provide this link.

Hyp. 5: The skill (and power used) in attempts to implement a practical plan will determine the success of the proposed new order. There was a notable lack of skill on the part of the BSU in dealing with bureaucratic channels. They did learn rather quickly what they were up against. They certainly learned how to upset the system. But such upsets did not help, and probably very much hindered the implementation of their plans and the success of their endeavor. Nathan Hare was making progress since he was officially recognized and following the usual channels. Eventually his plan was at least partially implemented.

However, as a partial result of the crisis, Nathan Hare was fired as acting chairman of the Black Studies Department by Hayakawa. The School of Ethnic Studies continued its existence. The EOP (Educational Opportunity Program) lost most of its financial support from the governor's budget cuts. The demand of unlimited Black enrollment in the Fall of 1969 was not achieved. A recommendation was made however that ten percent rather than the normal four percent of applicants could be accepted without meeting the usual entrance requirements. This allowed as many as 1800 nonwhites to enter with less than the normal qualifications. 1,000 of the expected 4,670 new students would be non-white, meaning that 4,750 or 26% of the 17,700 student enrollment would be non-white.

Hyp. 6: Early socialization strongly affects value conflicts. The early socialization of the trustees versus the members of the BSU were without a doubt poles apart in traditions and culture. It is no wonder that there could be no effective coming to terms with the conflicting values of staid business interests versus the feelings of Black consciousness and need for Black power.

Summary Chart and Hypotheses

There follows a complete flow diagram including all the variables treated in the previous four diagrams and clusters of hypotheses. Chart 5 is then followed by a complete listing of all hypotheses stated above which describe and explain the diagram itself.

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Institutionalizing Innovation in an Organization



55 Unplanned | Partly Planned | Plannable | Not Usually Planned 56

Problems (Cluster 1)

1A: The presently existing form of social order produces or facilitates certain kinds of social problems.

1B: The present form of social order (whatever it be) also contains, produces or facilitates certain varieties of organizational rigidity (and conservative weaknesses).

1C: Organizational rigidity leads to conflicts of interest.

1D: Conflict of values (or ideologies, especially between the elite and the masses, or management and workers) leads to conflict of interest.

1E: Interest conflict leads to social problems.

1F: Value conflict leads to mistrust between the parties.

1G: Mistrust leads to social problems.

1H: Social problems lead to certain crises in social (and organizational) relationships.

1I: See below.

1J: Conflict of interest leads to conflict of values.

Thrust of Actions (Cluster 2)

2A: Crises in social relationships lead to demands for change (by individuals, organizations or movements).

2B: Crises lead to solidification of public opinion (at least into distinguishable factions).

2C: The existence of a solid block of public opinion leads to demands (to leaders) for change.

2D: The existence of a solid block of public opinion leads to confirmation (to leaders) of the desire for the status quo.

2E: Demands for change tend to reach the elite.

2F: Demands for the status quo will also be communicated to the elite.

2G: Communication to the elite may be officially ignored (for political purposes or out of fear of change in the social order).

1I: If communication to the elite is officially ignored on an important issue, it will lead to a new crisis or a reinforcement of the old.

Sources of Change and Attempts (Cluster 3)

3A: In the degree to which reformers have hope of success they will more likely present reform proposals.

3B: The more reasonable reform proposals that are put forward, a) the more likely practical plans for change will (at least implicitly) be proposed, and b) the more attempts there will be at implementation.

3C: The more frequent and cogent the communication to the elite, the more likely reform proposals will be put forward.

3D: The presence of a self-study seminar will lead to communication of relatively more valid information (plans, proposals, wishes and demands) to the elite.

3F: The elite is more likely to communicate (and communicate smoothly) with a (/an organizationally approved) self-study seminar than with politically oriented or one-sided block representatives.

3G: An independently-conducted self-study seminar will be a factor in creating mutual trust between the conflicting parties or blocks.

3H:The prior mutual trust between parties will facilitate the setting up of a self-study seminar.

Background Facilitators (Cluster 4)

4A: If each person has at least a minimum acceptable level of purchasing power (with say a tuition grant based on his ability and then his desire for an education) this will lead to the institutionalization of voting equality (between citizens, whether they be members of the elite or the lower echelons).

4B: Mutual trust between conflicting parties facilitates the institutionalization of voting equality.

4C: Voting equality promotes a representative reform leadership.

4D: Reform leadership is more likely to be acceptable to the elite (organization or government leaders) than will self-styled leadership.

4E: Representative reform leadership will likely spend more time in communication with the elite than will self-styled leadership.

4F: Representative reform leadership is more likely to favor and promote the institutionalization of self-study seminars.

4G: Mutual trust between parties will facilitate the possibility of voting equality.

4H : Early socialization (traditions, and the meshing of social personality needs) of each party strongly influences the degree of mutual trust between them.

Remaining Linkages

5: The skill (and power used) in attempts to implement a practical plan will determine the success of the proposed new order.

6: Early socialization strongly affects value conflicts.

Recommendations: Some Conditions for Successful Innovation

Based on this model, hypotheses and case study it seems appropriate to at least suggest in summary fashion some insights and recommendations on how to facilitate the innovation process. The folllwing guidelines will hopefully be a useful checklist for administrators and change agents alike. These recommendations are only intuitively and indirectly derived from the model. Hence they are subject to much revision and reorganization as time and experience dictate. The most direct and simple way to present the recommendations seems to be as rules of thumb.

1. Realize that the wheels of tall bureaucracies turn slowly.

   A. Immediate decisions and agreements to make changes cannot legitimately be made even by the university president.

   B. The consultative process in participatory democracy is inefficient, although probably more just than any other system of government in the long run.

   C. Budgetary and procedural restrictions frequently, if not normally, hamstring the best intentions of even the most forward-looking administrators.

   D. Overly aggressive insistence upon immediate action will in all but rare instances tend to be counterproductive.

   E. Try to realize that bureaucracy exists because it is efficient for everyday affairs, however much it fails to be innovative in a broad sense.

2. A broad base of support must be mustered before large changes can be accomplished.

   A. This involves serious public relations directed at participants at every level in the hierarchy.

   B. Public relations output is equally necessary, of course, from administrators directed toward students, faculty, and the general public.

3. Attempts to initiate change must be preceded by serious planning of strategies, contingency plans, a possible grand design for administrative implementation, and tactics for convincing each level in the bureaucracy of the necessity and desirability of making your proposed changes.

A. "Non-negotiable demands" in this context have little chance of success.

B. Basic conflicts of values and interests must be brought out into the open and dealt with as explicitly as tact and empathy allow.

C. Even the most reasonable of men are inevitably limited in their perspective by their life experience and early socialization.

4. Public force and surveillance (police, national guard, militia, CIA, detectives in the classroom, etc.) are out of place in the classroom or the university.

A. When civil or criminal laws are violated on campus well-trained policemen should be called in. Especially in the case of crowd control police tactics must reflect excellent training, cool-headedness and experience.

5. Collective bargaining is preferable to a strike, except as a last resort after repeated bargaining attempts.

6. Obfuscation and termination of issues by administrators or secret committees are dishonest and reprehensible means of handling serious issues. There can be no trust in either direction under such conditions.

A. There can be no trust in either direction under such conditions.

B. A very high degree of consistency in administrative decisions and pronouncements is the only way to avoid confrontation and extended or destructive conflict.

7. Members of the elite (decision-makers) may ignore communications made to them for political purposes, out of fear of social or organizational change.

A. Their stated or unstated reasons may lie in the tone of the "demands." They may feel that to respond is to add a measure of dignity to what they consider unreasonable requests.

B. They may refuse to respond as a delaying tactic, hoping the issue may blow away or evaporate.

C. They may not know how to handle the problem directly.

D. They may, of course, also be "too busy."

E. The mail may have not gone through.

F. Or the secretarial staff may have misfiled the request.

8. The administration is more likely to respond when the communication is reasonably stated, easy to comply with, requires little time or effort, when the request doesn't cost anything, when it is politically neutral, or when it reinforces the status quo or asks for changes or action that will generate favorable publicity for the institution or the administration in charge.

9. Study committees which have no real power, which only make recommendations, are very unlikely to be effective.

   A. A democratic vote on an actual decision-making committee is the minimum requisite as an incentive for serious participation and useful effect of a study group.

   B. An academic self-study seminar for credit is a potentially powerful tool for understanding, initiating, and implementation of plans and processes of change.

10. Rigid adherence to bureaucratic rules must take second place to serious attempts to initiate and implement change. The spirit is more important than the letter of the law.

   A. Compartmentalization of issues is unlikely to solve deep and broadly-based problems.

   B. However, proposals which are too specific and detailed will inevitably stifle innovation and further experimentation.

11. Reform leadership must represent a significant and visible constituency (rather than being merely self-styled).

   A. This leadership should be firm but flexible and articulate.

   B. A broadly-based constituency is more likely to provide the necessary support for change.

   C. Willingness of the leadership to work constructively with administrators will have a more respected and stronger impact on administrators than mere insistence upon demands.

12. Innovation-attempts are more likely to be effective if based on realistic plans which are neither grandiose nor scattered.

   A. An appeal based on ideology or slogans without support by a practical program are more likely to create further conflict than to solve it.

13. In the comparatively short-run, reformist goals are more likely to succeed than revolutionary goals.

   A. Revolutionary change can only take hold when the solid majority of the people affected want it and will continue to work to keep it viable.

14. The language of appeals is more likely to be effective if it is reasoned, moderate and well-phrased rather than emotional, colored and loaded.

A. The rhetoric of the change-oriented group may well indulge privately in ditribe and biting sarcasm among one another to solidify their motivation for the struggle.

B. But the milder language backed by organization, evidence, and a genuine power base that is visible are all better stepping stones to success in actual diplomatic practice.

C. Such language is also more likely to promote mutual trust and to facilitate integrative bargaining through mutual understanding.

15. The bargaining process should so far as possible emphasize the the greater joint payoffs of the proposed change for both (or all) parties involved (say the student bloc vs. administration) rather than separate (or zero-sum) payoffs.

16. There should be an ongoing forum for airing basic differences, channels for dissent as well as an effective and rapid appeal process for resolving grievances.

A. The ombudsman idea may help in this regard, but it still does not meet the deeper needs of an effective voice with power for those in the minority position (such as students, Blacks, faculty in relation to all higher levels, especially the untenured faculty in relation to the administration of a large public university).

17. The following aims in the process of using power should be avoided if at all possible in the negotiation or influence process, in increasing order of negativity or undesirability:

A) Manipulation,
B) coercion,
C) destruction, or
D) violence.

18. In extreme cases where a clear majority is definitely in favor of the proposed change and the opposition (such as an intransigent administration prevents or ignores legitimate and serious attempts to implement the changes, then some of these negative tactics may have to be used simply in order to defend one's basic human rights.

19. In organizational context, trust is established by subjects toward administrators when:

A) administrators follow a consistent policy, clearly stated,
B) they have secure, balanced personalities,
C) they are sincerely interested in communicating with faculty and students,
D) when they are open to suggestion by underlings,
E) when they avoid needless delay,

F) when they put in the time and energy to implement the reasonable wishes of subjects,
G) when they have adequate material resources and staff to invistigate alternatives and carry out innovative policy decisions,
H) when they have the support of higher administrators for granting the petitioners' requests.

20. Trust is established in adminstrators toward subjects :
A) when subjects or petitioners (faculty and students) make reasonable requests in a reasonable manner,
B) when subjects have good self images,
C) when subjects are patient with the exigencies of bureaucracy,
D) when subjects are willing, able and effective in helping to implement and publicize the requested changes, once approved,
E) when the payoff resulting from the innovation is perceived to be at least as rewarding for the petitioner as for the administrators who grant the requests.

Theoretical Evaluation

It is important to give some measure of critical evaluation of the model as presented and applied based on certain criteria for a good theory. This is the best way to leave it open to criticism and improvement by future researchers, theorists and policy-makers, as well as by change-agents. The first criterion for a good theory is ease of application or testability. It is our opinion that the present model is more directly applicable to the politics of innovation in an organization than any other process theory known to the author. Static structure theories do not even begin to give an adequate understanding of such occurrences as vicious circles of recurring problems and attempts to solve them.

The second important criterion for a good theory is that of information value. The terms of the present theory are concrete, comprehensive in scope, systematically classified and interrelated in a chronological scheme. It crosses the boundaries of sociology, psychology, political science and practical management. It encompasses motives, moves, decisions, problems, background facilitators, sources of attempted change, and the prevailing form of organizational and social order. It at least points the way to more detailed analyses in the future of each of the relevant concepts.

The third criterion for a good theory is that of predictability. With the present model, an observer of the innovation process at any given moment can more easily predict which steps in the complex process will likely be experienced next. Several factors operate at once. And certain processes are inevitably experienced at different times by the same party. Or the same party experiences more than one process simultaneously. For example, while interest conflict is generating practical problems, at the same moment, members of some

affected partisan group may be writing reform proposals. Others may be making demands while a self-study seminar is in session. In addition, the previously listed policy recommendations should prove useful for administrators and change agents to speed the process or smooth the way and thus more certainly predict success for their efforts. It is however clearly impossible to predict in advance the outcomes of a struggle without shrewd observation and perhaps a large measure of practical wizardry.

The fourth criterion for a good theory, and the most important one is that of explanatory power. The present theory is stated in such a way that it is highly explanatory. The model is general enough to apply to many types of attempted or planned change in many types of organization. It explains why certain crucial steps in the process occur along the way. It helps in our experience to explain why some attempts succeed or fail. It helps to locate the bases for mutual trust and better communication along with effective decision making and policy implementation. It not only uses a systems theory approach on the highest level of generality, but it provides a complete description and explanation of that theory in terms of a deductively interrelated set of hypotheses. To achieve that is to have no small success in attaining the goal of a general theory of social organization.

We are aware of no other single theory or combination of theories that bring to bear so many relevant ideas or gives quite so much help to a rounded explanation of the extremely complex cluster of variables necessary for the case analyzed here. The theory is an example of general systems analysis which helps to synthesize and apply the insights of many other separate smaller theories in sociology

and social psychology. While remaining basically dialectical in approach and therefore processual in orientation, it does not slight structural and functional variables.

Research Directions

For the future, comparative analyses of say three case studies at a time should be made of attempts at innovation in organizations. This would be the best possible test of the utility of the model. Some refinement of hypotheses is necessary in order to lessen some of the residual ambiguity. A check list ought to be developed of the crucial variables as an aid to systematic analysis and comparison of the findings of future studies of this kind.

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